Practical Rationality in the Case of Genuine Practical Conflict

Abstract

There are two principles usually connected to practical rationality. These principles are the principle of consistency and the principle according to which “’ought’ implies ‘can.’” It has been said that an agent that faces a genuine conflict is not able to satisfy those principles at the same time. As a consequence, this agent is at fault, i. e. her practical reasoning is defective. In this paper, assuming Raz’s notion of genuine practical conflict, I will show that there is a weak interpretation of each of those principles that an agent facing a genuine conflict is able to meet. Besides, I try to show that this weak interpretation of those principles makes a practical difference. However, the main aim of the paper is to keep those principles for practical rationality without giving up the possibility of genuine conflicts.

Pau Luque

Pau Luque is a professor at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. He received his B.A. from Pompeu Fabra University of Barcelona. He received his Ph.D. in 2012 from University of Genoa and was a Ph.D. visiting student at the University of Chicago in 2010 – 2011. His research interests are Legal and Moral Disagreements, Moral Realism and Legal Interpretation.